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The use of auctions as a tool for procurement by businesses existed well before the advent 
of the Internet. Initially the Internet was used to duplicate existing offline auction facilities. In 
the late 1990’s online B2B auctions were proliferating and were being adopted in a wide 
variety of circumstances. The reverse auction tool has evolved to take advantage of Internet 
technology and online auctions have been identified by many large organisations as a tool to 
achieve procurement savings. As companies adopt this technology it is important for them to 
understand the implications of this type of procurement. This paper adopts a case study 
approach to identify the issues for both buyers and sellers using this type of B2B application. 
It describes the conduct of a reverse auction, from the preliminary steps all the way to the 
final awarding of the contract. The case study is viewed through the eyes of a supplier 
undertaking a reverse auction for the first time. The main outcomes show that the auction 
vendor and buyer were major winners with the supplier expending considerable time and 
effort to participate in the auction only to realise that the auction places cost above all other 
factors in awarding the contract. The importance of cost over service delivery, customer 
support and buyer-supplier relationship was the bitter pill the supplier had to swallow.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As organisations extend the reach of their information systems into the supply chain e-
procurement has become a driving force for achieving substantial cost savings. One 
mechanism that facilitates e-procurement is the reverse online auction. Reverse online 
auction are delivered by intermediaries and promise to deliver savings up to 20% for the 
buying organisations. The rhetoric of B2B collaboration has ‘win-win’ scenarios for all who 
participate in online auctions. Is this true? This paper will present a case study of an 
Australian reverse online auction asking the basic question, who wins? It will analyse the 
online auction from the supplier’s viewpoint and question the value proposition of the reverse 
online auction as a tool in B2B e-commerce. 
THE AUCTION MODEL 
Electronic commerce has increasingly adopted a wider and wider definition as innovative 
applications are developed. One recent application that has sought the ‘e’ treatment is 
procurement. Activities that could be applied to the e-Procurement (Minahan, 2001) process 
include: advertising tenders; electronic submission of tenders; electronic ordering; internet 
sourcing via third parties; electronic mail between buyers and sellers; electronic mail in 
contract management; research into supplier markets and integration of procurement within 
the financial and inventory systems. Accordingly there are a plethora of tools that have been 
developed to support these business activities. 
Procurement And The Auction Model 
Many research organisations predict massive growth in the B2B market. Bowles (2000) sees 
the global B2B market growing to US$968 million in 2002 and then US$1551 million in 2004 
but these figures pale into insignificance when considering other market analysts 
predictions; Gartner: US$2.9 trillion by 2003 AMR: US$5.7 trillion by 2004, Forrester: 
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US$7.29 trillion by 2004 (Regan, 2001; Hersch, 2000; Diba, 2001). Whilst these predictions 
should be accepted with caution there does seem to be a ‘sea change’ in how procurement 
is conducted in organisations. B2B promises (McGarvey, 2000) to drive costs down and 
streamline procurement operations. Metcalfe et al. (2001) predict that European companies 
could achieve a 50% productivity through internet enabled B2B processes by 2010.  
O’Malley (1998) saw the Web being “a giant bidding war” and Queree (2000) commented 
that online auctions were becoming a mainstream business model. The auction model has 
settled into the B2B marketplace and also was developed for various e-Government (NSW, 
2001) applications. Wyld (2001) saw the auction model being used in procurement, 
disposition of used assets and internal management. Batsone (1999) asked the question 
whether the price of everything is negotiable? At the heart of the auction economy is the 
concept of pricing and more importantly dynamic pricing. Dynamic pricing simply means that 
a good or service is priced according to what the market determines. Opensite(1999) 
provides a model to clarify the dynamic pricing categories (Figure 1).  
Many Auction 
(1 seller many buyers) 
Exchange 




(1 buyer bargaining 1 seller) 
Bidding 
(1 Buyer Many Sellers) 
  One Many 
  SELLERS 
Figure 1: Dynamic Pricing Categories 
The Web introduces the element of real-time pricing and further elevates the importance of 
personal price elasticity. Customers will determine the price depending upon the price/value 
trade-off. No longer is the supply/demand model (Batsone, 1999) determining price, a more 
complicated customer centric price/value trade-off determines pricing. Airlines use this 
principle when they have multiple price points for the one product.  
E-Procurement Model 
David Wyld (2001) developed an e-Procurement model that looked at the e-Procurement 
process from drivers through impact to imperatives. The model is presented below (Figure 
4). The model above demonstrates some of the changes that are affecting the e-
procurement value chain. Organisations on the buying and selling side will need to address 
these challenges to capture both the tactical cost control and the more strategic market 
developments.  
Online Auctions  
There are several differing auction formats used in online auctions (Wyld, 2001). English, 
Yankee, Dutch, Sealed bid, Vickrey and Reverse auctions are some formats used. Kafka et 
al. (2000) predicted that by 2004, US$746 billion of business will be conducted through 
online auction models based on dynamic pricing. Many of the Fortune 1000 companies have 
used online auctions as a tool to reduce prices for goods and services (Emiliani, 2000). 
One of the pioneers of online B2B auctions is Freemarkets, which was established in 1995 
and launched their online auction site in 1999. To date they have conducted auctions 
involving more than 19,000 suppliers from more than 70 countries worth US$30 billion 
(Freemarkets, 2002). In the first quarter of 2000, they conducted auctions involving 47 
Fortune 500 buyers and 4000 suppliers (Jan and Wu, 2000). Mayne Group, one of 
Australia’s leading companies with major interests in health-care and logistics signed a 
three-year deal in 2000 with Freemarkets to manage their procurement and operate online 
auctions. Other major B2B auction facilitators include Ariba, CommerceOne, Andale, 
Elcom.com and Verticalnet. The B2B auction facilitators usually work with buyers to select 
bidders to participate in each auction, develop specifications in detail, and tailor the bidding 
process to the situation. This service is billed to buyers accordingly. There could be 
additional costs based on a percentage of the anticipated savings (Messmer, 2000). 
Freemarkets (2002) promote the ability of their auction format to decrease services prices by 
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16-18% and goods by 2-3%. The reverse auction process involves intensive work on behalf 
of the buyer and market maker to structure the bidding process and prepare suppliers for 
qualification. The process is represented below (Table 1) (Buyers.gov, 2001). 
Drivers Impacts Imperatives 
Fast pace of tech 
innovation 
 
Internal linkage between 
supply chain and portal 
Economic Globalisation 
 
Shift of power from 
suppliers to buyers 
Develop online supplier 
qualification 
Rapid growth of e-
Business portal sector 
Leverage suppliers into e-
Portal marketplaces 
Large organisations 
become market makers 
Market makers increasing 
competition 
Develop vertical markets 









New product and services 
requirements 
 
Build strategic alliances 
between e-Commerce 
players 
Figure 2: e-Procurement Model (Wyld, 2000:4) 
Make market (specifications) 




Ability to deliver, Quality assurance 
Past performance, Responsibilities 
Set-up technicals 
Approved suppliers listing 
Identify specific terms and conditions 
2) Pre-Qualification (Supplier Focus) 
Invite suppliers 
Set up Auction 
Create auction content, Set-up security 
Register bidders, Ensure readiness 
Contingency planning 
3) Pre Auction Planning (Client/ Supplier) 
Supplier Auction Strategy 
4) Auction Activity (Supplier) 
Conduct Auction 
Suppliers bid real-time, Buyers monitors auction 
Winners selected, Contingencies ready 
5) Post Auction (Client) Contract write-up 
Table 1: Reverse Auction Format. (Adapted from Buyers.gov, 2000) 
Research Questions 
The primary objective of the study was to analyse an Australian example of reverse auction 
procurement and analyse the auction process and outcomes in view of the dynamic pricing 
model presented in Figure 1and the drivers and impacts e-procurement presented in figure 
2. The viewpoint of the supplier will be presented, as there is a dearth of literature detailing 
the impacts upon a supplier participating in an online auction. This will be presented in a 
case study. More specifically the research questions of the paper are: 
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RQ1. How is an online auction conducted? 
RQ2. What are the business impacts of the online auction? 
RQ3. Does the reverse auction have a future? 
Methodology 
Case study research methodology was used as this paper presented an exploratory look at 
implications of reverse online auctions. Yin(1994:35) emphasises the importance of asking 
‘what’ when analysing information systems. Yin goes further and emphasises the need to 
study contemporary phenomena within real life contexts. Walsham (2000:204) supports 
case study methodology and sees a need for a move away from traditional information 
systems research methods such as survey toward more interpretative case studies, 
ethnographies and action research projects. Several works have used case studies (Chan, 
2001; Lee, 1989; Benbasat et al., 1987) in presenting information systems case-study 
research. Cavaye (1995) used case study research to analyse inter-organisational systems 
and the complexity of information systems. The data collection process included 
examination of existing documentation, content analysis of email, interview of actors and 
direct observations. The auction event was analysed from the supplier organisation 
viewpoint with particular emphasis on the participants and outcomes of the event.  
In April 2001 AusBuyer commissioned Auction.Com to make a market for the logistics 
component of their manufacturing activities. The market was broken down into 19 channels 
both state and nationally based. AusSupplier received notification that a contract that it had 
partially carried out for three years was to be auctioned on the Internet. AusSupplier started 
a six-month exploration into online auctions and B2B procurement. Considerable time and 
financial resources were expended in firstly learning and then secondly participating in the 
reverse online auction. The three participants in the auction event were AusSupplier, 
Auction.Com and AusBuyer.  
CASE STUDY 
RQ1. How is an online auction conducted? 
AusSupplier is a micro-business with 2 full time and 5 part time consultants. It is an 
‘infomediary’ or in older language a ‘middleman’. AusSupplier turns over A$10 million and 
has a small client base. The role of the ‘infomediary’ is to win a contract for packing and 
exporting commodities into the Asian marketplace. AusSupplier wins a contract from a large 
manufacturer (AusBuyer) and then negotiates transport and shipping rates. The commodity 
that was to be auctioned was worth about A$1.6 million per year. Currently AusSupplier was 
responsible for about 20% of the contract and a major transport company was responsible 
for the remaining 80%. AusAuction.Com is a multi-national market leading e-Commerce 
company specialising in e-Procurement and auctions. They have about 1000 employees 
worldwide and operate for about 140 large multi-national clients. They have conducted about 
US$21 billion in auctions resulting in savings of about US$6 billion. It is obvious when 
looking at Auction.Com and AusSupplier the difference in size, technology and more 
importantly the chasm in understanding e-Business. AusBuyer is an Australian manufacturer 
that is part of a global organisation based in US. The global organisation was undergoing 
financial strain due to the poor commodities market worldwide. In order to reduce costs 
AusBuyer turned to Auction.Com to conduct a number of auction events. This case study 
outlines just one of the 19 auction events conducted for different services. Once again we 
see a major difference between the globally based Auction.Com and AusBuyer and the 
micro-business AusSupplier.  
The Auction Process 
The auction event was an Australia wide procurement exercise focussing on logistics and 
transport. The entire procurement operation of AusBuyer was placed in 19 lots with each lot 
undergoing a 1.5 hr auction. For AusSupplier the auction event went through 5 stages;  
• Market-made (client),  
• Pre-qualification (supplier),  
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• Pre-auction planning and Strategy (client/supplier),  
• Conduct Auction (supplier), 
• Post auction (client). 
In stage 1 (Market-made), AusSupplier undertook research into the reverse auction process, 
then received a CD containing web based bidding software and documentation from the 
manufacturer. This documentation consisted of over 50 files including tender documents, 
quote spreadsheets, specifications and information. It was updated four times before the 
final auction. Initially the deluge of information was overwhelming. 
I have hours retrieving, printing, reading and just trying to make sense of the 
process. 
Managing Director, AusSupplier, May 2001 
At this stage considerable effort was expended in determining if AusSupplier could 
participate in more than one channel (auction). It was felt that other channels, including 
some interstate, could be bid for but a more conservative approach was adopted due to 
uncertainty in the online auction process.  
Stage 2, (Pre-qualification), involves Auction.Com and AusBuyer weeding out non-
performing suppliers but at the same time try to ensure an adequate number of bidders to be 
able to create the auction dynamic. AusSupplier had no idea how many other companies 
had pre-qualified, it only learnt of the number at the auction event. Pre-qualification also 
introduces some financial parameters for the event. Auction.Com set the switching price at 
A$1.3million, that is, the price when AusBuyer would consider awarding the contracting 
away from the existing supplier. Market research by AusSupplier showed the existing 
contract was worth A$1.6million. The difference between the price of switching to a new 
supplier and the existing contract price was about 18%. This figure is similar to the figure 
quoted in the advertising material by Auction.Com that quotes savings of 18%. AusSupplier 
again had expended considerable resources at this stage; two site visits, 4 sub-contractor 
meetings, 200 phone calls, 45 emails out, 15 emails in, 30 hours of managing director time 
and 20 hours of consultants time. The bill for participating in the reverse auction was 
climbing.  
Summarising the financial details thus far: 
AusSuppliers market entry price  A$ 2 million 
Existing contract price    A$ 1.6 million 
Reserve (Switching) price   A$ 1.3 million 
The AusSupplier’s high market entry price (A$2 million) was formulated on the basis of entry 
into an unknown scenario. It was formulated on the rate of moving the commodity by the 
tonnages quoted by AusBuyer with a margin built in. At this stage it became apparent that 
the auction format was introducing an element of incredulity to the quoting process.  
We are flying in the dark, some cowboy could underbid us and have no real 
idea of what is involved in the job… 
Managing Director, AusSupplier, June 2001 
No idea of how many others bidders, no idea of their market entry point and only one 
Auction.Com tutorial on a simulated auction. Being pre-qualified and waiting for the auction 
became quite stressful for the AusSupplier. Questions were raised in regard to; what 
strategy should be adopted? what would happen if the power failed, or the ISP went down? 
what would be the ‘bottom-line’ position, would AusSupplier be swept up in the auction 
dynamic? Who would press the buttons, would they be able to keep their nerve? 
Auction.Com conducted a training session from their Asian headquarters and AusSupplier 
personnel had soon mastered the auction interface.  
In Stage 3 (Auction Strategy), AusSupplier developed three strategies for the auction; entry, 
middle and end strategy. The entry strategy was to come in at the high pre-qualification bid 
after about 3 minutes and then watch the market develop. The middle strategy was to 
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maintain control on the screen and drive the bids down in a controlled manner. During the 
auction event AusSupplier would not know who were responsible for the other bids. The only 
strategy for the end was to be in the ‘end game’ and if they did not have the lowest bid then 
at least they would be under the switching cost at the end. This was felt would show 
AusBuyer that AusSupplier was a serious bidder. It was stated that AusBuyer was not under 
any obligation to accept the lowest bid. AusSupplier had seen sample auction events and 
knew the ‘end game’ was frantic. 
Stage 4, (Auction), was delayed a week with a late flurry of updates and clarifications. Finally 
the day of the auction arrived and AusSupplier at 10:33am pressed the bid accept button to 
indicate they were part of the event. Within 5 seconds AusSupplier’s early and middle 
strategies were destroyed. They now saw three other bidders with one bidder right on the 
switching price (A$1.3 million). This was felt to be a ploy to scare off other bidders and they 
were confident that this was the existing contractor who had 80% of the existing contract. 
After about half an hour another bidder entered and soon started to drive the bidding price 
down further. Aus Supplier’s strategy was to drive down the bids to the reserve price. As the 
scheduled auction time was nearing completion the bidding intensified and AusSupplier’s 
phones were put on hold. A bid in the last minute extends the auction by minute. There were 
three bidders left. There was tension in AusSupplier personnel as the low price previously 
agreed upon was passed. This resulted in the staff member in front of the computer handing 
over control to the managing director. The auction entered the phase that Auction.Com refer 
to as the ‘auction dynamic’, the dynamic that drives the price down even further. The reserve 
was driven down $90,000 in 7 minutes. The number of bids in the last 7 minutes tripled all 
bids in the previous 1.5 hours. The managing director became caught up in the auction 
dynamic as he did not want to lose to the other bidders. AusSupplier’s lowest bid was based 
on an agreed margin of 12% was reduced to 5% towards the end of the auction. 
AusSupplier did not win the auction but that did not mean that they had not won the contract. 
They were in the game at the end and were determined to drive the market down to inflict 
some pain on the other bidders. 
In Stage 5, (Post Auction), AusSupplier was told that they would have to wait 5 weeks for the 
result, however it came much earlier. AusSupplier were unsuccessful, they had lost the 20% 
of the contract that they had owned previously. The managing director took about two weeks 
to get over losing to the competition. There are several issues that need to be discussed 
concerning the winners and losers of reverse auction e-Procurement.  
DISCUSSION 
RQ2. What are the business impacts of the online auction? 
So who really benefited from the auction event? Auction.com was the big winner by gaining 
their initial consulting fees for setting up the auction event and also gaining a percentage of 
the savings from AusBuyer. They can also use this auction event to demonstrate their 
auction technology to other large Australian companies. AusBuyer appeared to be the next 
big winner with a tangible savings of a 20% reduction in the cost of the contract. There were 
minimal switching costs as they awarded the contract to the company who held the majority 
(80%) of the contract previously. However from this Auction.com costs need to be 
subtracted. An intangible benefit was the pre-qualifying process that identified future suitable 
suppliers. It appears the pre-qualifying process was flawed in one of the other auction 
events conducted on the same day when only one supplier was identified and this was the 
existing contractor. The auction event still went ahead and resulted in a 5% increase in the 
contract cost. In this case the auction dynamic was missing and therefore no savings were 
made. AusBuyer can also use the auction event to determine how low different suppliers can 
go which can be the basis for future negotiations. AusSupplier has prided itself on providing 
a service second to none. Any glitches in the supply of the commodity, any problems in 
logistics or shipping never presented a problem. In this case AusBuyer may have been 
under global pressure to drive down prices, but will there be a price to pay when the contract 
lapses and a premium needs to be paid to bring in another supplier to complete the contract. 
This scenario occurred three year prior to the online auction being adopted. 
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Another winner appears to be the supplier who won the contract. However prior to the 
auction they had 80% of the contract at a price of A$1.28 million. They now have the full 
contract at approximately the same price. Twenty percent more work for minimal extra 
money. Two impacts from the Wyld Model (Figure 2.) seem to be supported in this case 
study. There was a considerable shift of power from the supplier to buyer as evidenced by 
the dramatic drop in contract spend and the market makers did increase competition within 
the marketplace as evidenced by the increase in bidders in the auction format. The 
imperatives for the buyer in the Wyld model (Figure 2) were supported. Suppliers were 
leveraged into the auction portal, a strategic alliance was formed between the buyer and 
auction vendor and finally an internal linkage was created between the supply chain and 
then auction portal. 
RQ3. Does the reverse auction have a future? 
Smeltzer and Carr (2000) after conducting a number of interviews with companies involved 
in reverse auctions found that buyers were initially attracted to online auctions due to the 
promise of a reduced purchase price and believed that the suppliers were motivated by an 
improvement in communication about the market and the opportunity to obtain increased 
sales. Reverse online auctions appear to be an essential tool for procurement needs. 
However many of the companies who use online auctions as buyers are reluctant to 
participate in them when they become a supplier (Manufacturingnews.com, 2001). The 
online auction is based on the premise that the buyer is being overcharged by its current 
suppliers, and the online reverse auction will achieve the lowest price. But where does the 
price reduction come from? The supplier who eventually won the contract has to provide 
more services for roughly the same amount of money. Emiliani and Stec (2001) believe that 
the risk of losing current business coerces suppliers to participate in the auction event. They 
are electronically coerced by watching other suppliers bids in real time compelling them to 
bid which was the case with AusSupplier when they went below their agreed price. Many 
analysts (Wyld, 2000; Deise et al., 2000) believe that the use of the Internet as a medium for 
business provides the opportunity for companies to restructure their supply chains in 
collaboration with the other supply chain partners. One of the imperatives in the e-
procurement model proposed by Wyld (2000) was to build strategic alliance between 
business partners. This involves both buyers and vendors working collaboratively to provide 
cost efficiencies and add value to products and services. Many believe that this strategic 
collaboration is essential to survive in the e-world. The premise of the Value Trust Network 
(VTN) (Raisch, 2001) sees the supply chain being enhanced by the established 
relationships between buyers and suppliers, not only by the adoption of Internet technology. 
If reverse auction e-procurement is to enhance enterprise competitiveness then value must 
be delivered to ease industry pain points (Raisch, 2001; Emiliani, 2002; Jap, 2000) with trust 
being enhanced between suppliers and buyer. The question needs to be asked to what 
extent do reverse online auctions contribute to this value and trust? The whole issue of 
driving costs down to the lowest possible level would provide a serious impediment to any 
creation of value (Bartholomew, 2001) and trust. The attributes and skills that buyers would 
like to foster in their suppliers are placed at a lower priority to price. Do companies really 
want business only run on lowest price? Rapport (1998) believes that a reverse online 
auction is only a ‘quick fix’ to satisfy management objectives of increased shareholder value.  
CONCLUSION 
There is much hype surrounding e-procurement and its associated tools. Many companies 
are drawn to reverse online auctions as a means of reducing costs, as a 20% margin 
organisation will render a $5 saving for every $1 saved in procurement. But these 
companies need to weigh up the initial savings against the possible detrimental impact these 
auctions could have on their supplier relationships. Reverse auctions do not teach buyers 
and sellers how to jointly solve supply chain problems and collaboratively develop new 
products and services. Emiliani prosed several unresolved question in his study of reverse 
auction (Emiliani, 2002); where does the cost saving come from? Are reverse auctions one-
time events, will online auction vendors replace the in-house buying function? Is there a 
conflict between supply chain management and online auctions and finally do online 
auctions actually increase productivity. In this case the reverse auction did render massive 
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cost savings, did replace existing in-house procurement and finally did increase supplier 
distrust. The fundamental question of how much value was added through the reverse online 
auction will need to be analysed over the length of the contract. Will we see another online 
auction with a 20% savings in the procurement function in two years? The managing director 
of AusSupplier commented; “20% now, 20% next time, if we are still in business”. 
AusSupplier had expended considerable resources to prepare for the auction event and 
ended up losing the contract. But a greater risk was that they got caught up in emotion 
associated with the competitive nature of auctions and were getting close to bidding 
unreasonably low prices. Since the auction event AusSupplier has been approached to 
participate in another auction that has the potential to increase their business. They are 
reluctant. 
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